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The crisis in Ukraine and the Russian intervention have brought about a situation in which it is 
necessary for Germany to make decisions and take action. No one in Berlin was prepared for 
this nor did anyone want this to occur. The effect of this is that the government has adopted 
a clearly critical stance on Russia, albeit in tandem with cautious diplomatic moves; it has given 
its consent to limited sanctions on representatives of the Russian elite, and has disapproved of 
economic sanctions. On the other hand, voices have been heard in the political debate in Ger-
many not only warning of the catastrophic consequences of a deterioration in German-Russian 
relations but also those in fact expressing understanding for the Russian reaction. Although 
it is typical above all of the business circles engaged in Russia and the authors of Germany’s 
Ostpolitik to downplay the Kremlin’s moves, political parties and the German public are divided 
over how Germany should respond to Moscow’s policy, and this dispute will worsen. 
Berlin will take a whole array of actions to de-escalate the conflict, since the imposition of 
radical political and economic sanctions on Russia would also have a strong adverse effect on 
Germany. As regards sanctions, Germany would not only sustain economic losses, but they 
would also undermine the ideological foundations for the still popular vision for Germany’s 
strategy towards Russia in which great emphasis is laid on a strong “respect for the EU’s most 
important neighbour and its interests”. 
Germany’s diplomatic offensive1 in response to 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is intended at pre-
venting President Vladimir Putin from expand-
ing his military intervention beyond Crimea and 
at causing representatives of Russia and Ukraine 
to become involved in direct talks and thus settle 
mutual relations and end the conflict. Germany 
has also agreed to talks with Russia concerning 
1 Chancellor Merkel has held numerous telephone conversa-
tions with President Putin since the conflict began, which 
is very important for the Russian side (this was emphasised 
by Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, in an interview for 
ZDF TV on 30 March). Furthermore, the German minister 
of foreign affairs, Steinmeier, visited Kyiv and Donetsk on 
22 March, and Gernot Erler, the German government’s Rus-
sian affairs coordinator, visited Moscow on 24–25 March. 
the economic part of the Association Agree-
ment between the EU and Ukraine, and seems 
to be ready to accept part of Russian demands 
regarding Ukraine2, including the most import-
ant one, namely a ‘federalisation of Ukraine’. 
This federalisation de facto means transforming 
Ukraine into a confederation of independent re-
gions, and will offer Moscow direct influence 
on the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine, 
and indirectly on the whole country. Berlin is 
2 This also concerns accountability for crimes committed 
by those involved in the clashes on the Maidan (by both 
sides, as emphasised by Germany), radical right groupings 
being excluded from government bodies and the need to 
guarantee the Russian minority’s rights in Ukraine. 
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ready to help Kyiv conduct the reforms and will 
employ for this purpose the numerous forums 
of political and economic co-operation Germa-
ny has been developing in Ukraine since the 
mid 1990s. It is also prepared to help stabilise 
Ukraine’s financial situation, above all by taking 
action as part of the IMF and the EU. Such aid 
may be offered on condition that Ukraine com-
mits to adopt a package of structural reforms. 
Germany has thus far backed the EU’s plan to 
grant immediate financial assistance to Ukraine 
and loans worth 15 billion euros in the com-
ing years and also to open up the EU’s inter-
nal market for Ukrainian companies. Berlin has 
also suggested that funds offered to Ukraine as 
part of development aid could be increased by 
20 million euros annually (33 million euros were 
offered as part of this aid in 2011).
The background of the German stance
The German stance on the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict is an effect of the changes which have 
been taking place on the German political 
scene over the past few years and in German 
public opinion regarding the country’s poli-
cy towards Russia. Two opposing approaches 
have been present in the debate on this issue. 
Supporters of the first approach cultivate 
the key guidelines of Germany’s Ostpolitik 
dating back to the 1970s (“change through rap-
prochement”), including its more recent varia-
tion, i.e. neue Ostpolitik and the Partnership for 
Modernisation (“change through integration”). 
They view Russia as the European Union’s key 
economic partner with whom it is necessary to 
co-operate in order to establish a stable Euro-
pean security order3. In their opinion, stability 
in Europe requires a strategic partnership with 
Russia, even if this involves making concessions, 
especially given the security challenges in the 
post-Soviet area, which is seen as Russia’s nat-
ural “sphere of influence.” To put co-operation 
of this kind with Russia into practice, political 
and economic relations should be institution-
alised both at the bilateral level and as part of 
contacts between the EU and Russia. This is also 
expected to contribute to enhancing the global 
role of the European Union, and thus serve the 
political and economic interests of Germany, 
since it is a leading EU member state. Accord-
ing to this approach, the strong economisation 
of German-Russian relations is a positive factor, 
which will trigger the synergy effect – economic 
interests (enhancing energy co-operation and 
increasing the engagement of German compa-
nies on the Russian market) will build up the 
political interests, and thus both platforms of 
the strategic partnership – political and eco-
nomic – will be reinforced. 
The other approach is an effect of the frus-
tration with the lack of success of the pol-
icy towards Russia as described above and is 
based on the conviction that the strength of 
this country should be measured by its destruc-
tive potential rather than its desire for construc-
tive action. This approach has been formed as 
a consequence of events in Russia itself, i.e. 
Vladimir Putin’s return to power and his in-
creasingly aggressive policy oriented towards 
Russia regaining its superpower status and 
rebuilding its area of influence – one proof of 
which is the annexation of Crimea – and sup-
pression of any signs of civil society activity in 
Russia. Germany has made changes in its policy, 
i.e. a growing interest in and the development 
3 Germany has thus far made consistent efforts to establish 
co-operation with Russia in Eastern Europe. This co-opera-
tion has been based, for example, on including Moscow in 
attempts to stabilise the region (e.g. the so-called “Mese-
berg Process”) instead of antagonising it (hence Merkel’s 
firm rejection of the proposal to cover Ukraine with 
a Membership Action Plan at the NATO summit in 2008). 
The German government has adopted 
a clearly critical stance on Russia in the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict, albeit in tan-
dem with cautious diplomatic moves.
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of closer political and economic co-operation 
with new regional powers, especially China, the 
establishment of partnerships based on raw 
material supplies, and – last but not least – Ger-
many’s decision to undergo an energy transfor-
mation which is aimed at ensuring Germany’s 
independence from energy suppliers through 
the development of renewable energy sources 
(RES). All these taken together have all had an 
equally great impact on the formation of this 
viewpoint. Given this new context, those who 
view Russia from a more critical and demand-
ing angle believe that it will remain an import-
ant strategic partner but will no longer be the 
only one in the economic and political co-oper-
ation of Germany besides the EU and the USA. 
However, both of these factions have a few 
key features in common: 
• the unbreakable belief in the success of Willy 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik, as part of which strong eco-
nomic relations were established with Russia in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and which has been in-
terpreted as a key strategy which enabled the 
reunification of Germany;
• sticking to the key principle in German politi-
cal culture, namely continuing dialogue and the 
search for consensus, especially with a strong 
partner; 
• viewing Berlin as a mediator and intermediary 
between Russia and the West;
• not seeing Russia as a military threat to Europe; 
• advocating the broadest possible participa-
tion for Russia in debate and actions concerning 
the future of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, 
which in fact means treating Russia as the only 
real partner in the areas of politics, security and 
economy in the CIS countries. 
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the grow-
ing pressure on Germany to take a clear 
stance on the Russian aggression in Crimea 
have fuelled the debate in politics and the me-
dia in Germany. As a consequence, the above 
mentioned divides have reappeared. Although 
these divides have been increasingly evident re-
cently, they have been underplayed on purpose. 
One of the reasons for this was the fact that 
even though political relations between Berlin 
and Moscow had cooled significantly, trade and 
economic co-operation was still going well4. 
Most political parties (the CDU/CSU and the SPD 
from the government coalition and the Green 
Party from the opposition) have backed the ac-
tions taken in response to the present crisis by 
both Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier (he became the most popular pol-
itician in Germany during the crisis, overtaking 
Merkel). They are of the opinion that the West 
had to respond firmly to Russia’s violation of 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but they are scepti-
cal about the possible imposition of heavy sanc-
tions. A significant part of the German public 
also have a positive opinion about the foreign 
policy adopted by the grand coalition (67% of 
respondents) and more broadly also that of the 
West as a whole (60% of respondents).
The German government is united in its stance, 
regardless of the party its individual ministers 
belong to: Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU), Sig-
mar Gabriel (the minister for economy and depu-
ty chancellor representing the SPD), the minister 
of foreign affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) 
and the minister of finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, 
(CDU) all want to continue dialogue with Russia 
while emphasising that Russia has much more to 
lose than Germany and the EU in both political 
4 Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, ‘Germany on Russia. Yes to 




The pro-Russian lobby in Germany views 
Russia as the EU’s key geopolitical partner 
who has its natural “sphere of influence” 
and co-operation with whom is necessary, 
being beneficial for the German economy.
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and economic terms5. It is clear that the German 
government is determined to avoid a confronta-
tion with Russia and is surprised that Russia has 
not taken a similar approach in return. 
However, politicians are still divided in the de-
bate concerning the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, 
and the differences between them are not pre-
cisely determined by their party membership. 
Appeals for treating the Russian moves with 
understanding have been heard among the 
Christian Democrats (e.g. Philipp Mißfelder and 
Peter Gauweiler), from the SPD (e.g. Gernot Er-
ler, the German government’s Russian affairs 
coordinator and the former chancellors Gerhard 
Schroder and Helmut Schmidt), as well as among 
politicians of the Left Party (the largest opposi-
tion grouping in the Bundestag). Accepting and 
propagating Russian arguments, for example 
that Russia has been surrounded by the EU and 
NATO, that the West is co-responsible for the 
annexation of Crimea due to NATO enlargement 
and that Moscow’s actions need to be treated 
with understanding6 are also widespread in part 
5 This has been emphasised among others by Mr Schauble, 
who said that “Russia has more to lose than we do in the me-
dium term. Germany is not interested in escalating the con-
flict, but the events in Crimea cannot be accepted so easily.” 
W. Schauble, ‘Russland hat mehr zu verlieren’, Handelsblatt, 
27 March 2014, Cf.: ‘Merkel lehnt schärfere Sanktionen gegen 
Russland ab’, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-03/
merkel-wirtschaftssanktionen-russland-obama
6 Cf. for example: P. Mißfelder, ‘Russland ernst nehmen’, 
http://de.theeuropean.eu/philipp-missfelder--2/8121-
deutschlands-rolle-auf-der-krim--2 (accessed on 27 March 
2014), ‘Gauweiler hält deutsche Russland-Politik für ge-
fährlich’, http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/stern-in-
terview-gauweiler-haelt-deutsche-russland-politik-fuer-ge-
faehrlich-2098929.html (accessed on 27 March 2014); 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/faz-net-frue-
hkritik/tv-kritik-anne-will-der-westen-hat-russland-betro-
gen-12866221.html (accessed on 26 March 2014).
of the media and among experts and business 
circles in Germany (which are traditionally repre-
sented by the Committee on Eastern European 
Economic Relations7). As a result, part of the 
German public tolerate Russia treating Ukraine, 
and especially Crimea, as its “sphere of influ-
ence” (54% of respondents). The fear of retalia-
tion from Russia as a consequence of the possi-
ble imposition of sanctions by the West causes 
most respondents (58%) to reject this form of 
pressure on Moscow and to be opposed to the 
international isolation of Russia and to desire 
direct talks with Putin (82%; the surveys were 
conducted in March by the following research 
centres: Emnid, TNS and Infratest dimap). Fur-
thermore, frequent references have been made 
in the German debate to the one hundredth an-
niversary of the outbreak of World War I, which 
is viewed in Germany as the main cause of the 
subsequent European tragedies of the 20th cen-
tury (World War II and the division of Europe). 
This is used as an additional argument for the 
need to continue dialogue with Russia. This di-
alogue is expected to prevent military conflict 
between the West and Russia, which the pacifist 
German public is anxious about. 
The possible economic consequences 
of a conflict with Russia – 
what does Germany fear? 
In retaliation to possible sanctions, Moscow 
could use two channels of economic coopera-
tion in an attempt to harm the German econo-
my: trade and investments. However, it appears 
that Russia could sustain greater losses as a con-
sequence. Trade with Russia is important for Ger-
many because of its structure, and not its value. 
7 Gerhard Schroder, Alexander Rahr, Vladimir Grinin and 
the head of Ost-Ausschuss, Eckhard Cordes, met in early 
March at the Russian embassy in Berlin to discuss the 
creation of an economic space to integrate Russia and 
Europe. Cf.: ‘Die dubiosen Aktivitäten des Altkanzlers 
im Sinne Putins’ http://www.swr.de/report/die-dubi-
osen-aktivitaeten-des-altkanzlers-im-sinne-putins/-/
id=233454/did=13102054/nid=233454/958krn/index.
html (accessed on 26 March 2014). 
Germany wants to continue dialogue with 
Russia while emphasising that Russia has 
much more to lose than Germany and the 
EU in both political and economic terms in 
case the conflict is aggravated.
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Germany has scarce natural resources and needs 
uninterrupted supplies due to its well-developed 
industry. Russia is above all a major supplier of 
fuels: natural gas, crude oil and coal. Supply cuts 
would cause shortages of these fuels in Germa-
ny, but Russia would also lose credibility. 
The key suppliers of the most important fuels for 
Germany in 2013 (as percentage of total imports)















Germany could react in different ways to raw 
material supply cuts, but Russian gas supplies 
would be the most difficult to substitute for. 
Germany decided to develop its gas storages 
already after the Ukrainian gas crisis in 2009. 
Its present reserves are sufficient to satisfy 
the country’s demand for gas for around two 
months. However, if Gazprom and BASF imple-
ment the deal as scheduled in mid 20148, the 
Russian side will gain control over 20% of the 
German gas storage facilities. Another problem 
is posed by the fact that Germany would find 
it difficult to diversify its gas supply sources, 
8 On 23 December 2013, BASF and Gazprom signed an asset 
exchange agreement (to be implemented in mid 2014). As 
part of this agreement, BASF’s subsidiary, Wintershall, is to 
receive shares in block IV and V of the Achimov gas field 
(25% +1 shares) in western Siberia, while Gazprom may 
take over half of Wintershall’s stake in gas trader compa-
nies which have thus far been co-controlled by both com-
panies. Gazprom will also receive as part of the deal  half of 
shares of companies responsible for gas exploration, trad-
ing and storage  in companies ensuring BASF sales worth 
10 billion euros and profits worth 0.5 billion euros. 
since it has no LNG terminal. Furthermore, gas 
supplies from Holland will be gradually reduced 
since its fields are approaching exhaustion. 
Germany hopes that development of renew-
able energy sources (RES) could contribute to 
a reduction of its gas imports9. Oil supply cuts 
would also be problematic, especially in eastern 
Germany, whose refineries (Schwedt – owned 
by a consortium formed by Shell, BP, Total, Eni 
and Rosneft; and Leuna – owned by Total) are 
totally reliant on supplies from Russia. Since 
they have been adapted to processing of Rus-
sian oil, a conflict with Russia might restrict their 
production capacity. When oil supplies were in-
terrupted at the time of the Russian-Belarusian 
crises in 2007 and 2010, the output of the re-
fineries fell, and it was only possible to bring 
part of the missing raw material from Russia by 
sea via the Rostock port. However, this route 
cannot compensate fully for the transport ca-
pacity of the oil pipelines running from Russia. 
If supplies from Russia were reduced, Germa-
ny could try to modernise its eastern refineries 
to make them able to process other brands of 
oil in addition to those from Russia, and to in-
crease the production capacity of the refineries 
in the west of the country, which would supply 
fuel to eastern Germany. However, the neces-
sary adjustments required to put such changes 
into place would be expensive and time-con-
suming. A cut in coal supplies would not cause 
any major problems, since the markets are cur-
rently oversupplied with coal. 
Russia is not a key outlet for German goods; 
it is ranked 11th after such countries as China, 
Poland and Belgium, and is only slightly ahead 
of the Czech Republic. Therefore, losing the 
9 Although the share of gas in electricity production has 
been falling as a consequence of RES development, it is 
becoming an increasingly important heating fuel for eco-
nomic reasons. Furthermore, Russian gas bought at com-
petitive prices would serve as a good supplementation 
in case of fluctuations in renewable energy levels due to 
weather conditions. The output of wind farms and solar 
panels is dependent on weather conditions (sun exposure, 
wind strength), and gas power plants are a good substi-
tute for them, since they can be quickly connected to and 
disconnected from the network, unlike coal and nuclear 
power plants, whose reaction time is much longer. 
The one hundredth anniversary of the out-
break of World War I is used as an argu-
ment for the need to continue dialogue 
with Russia. 
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Russian market would not be painful for 
Germany, since it could be compensated by ex-
ports to other rapidly growing markets. German 
firms beyond any doubt would be able to re-
coup their losses in Russia by expanding to 
other emerging markets, where their position 
is already strong, such as China, Mexico, India, 
Brazil and Indonesia. 
The two countries also have close capital links, 
which would also have to be restricted should 
economic sanctions be put in place. Capital 
flow from Germany to Russia is definitely more 
intense than in the reverse direction. In 2011, 
accumulated German investments in Russia 
reached 18 billion euros, while Russian invest-
ments in Germany were worth 3.2 billion euros. 
This means that Germany is an important source 
of funds for Russia, and German high-quality 
products contribute to the modernisation of the 
Russian economy. For Germany this means the 
possibility for 6,000 firms to do business and 
these employ, according to estimates, 300,000 
people. Russian firms have a share in the Ger-
man energy sector and also in shipyards, tourist 
services and chemical and fertiliser production. 
German banks, which have granted loans to 
Russian companies worth 16.8 billion euros, 
would also sustain losses. 
The awareness of the above mentioned econom-
ic consequences in the case of a long-term dete-
rioration of relations with Russia has given rise to 
active appeals from representatives of German 
heavy industry, especially from the energy, elec-
trical engineering and machine-building sectors, 
to treat the stance taken by Moscow in the pres-
ent conflict with understanding. Press and TV in-
terviews given by the CEO of E.ON and represen-
tatives of the Committee on Eastern European 
Economic Relations opposing the imposition of 
economic sanctions on Russia and talks between 
the CEO of Siemens and Vladimir Putin10 have in 
fact backed the Kremlin’s narrative. The hasty 
deal struck by Germany’s RWE and the Russian 
fund LetterOne11 as part of which a company in-
volved in oil and gas exploration was sold can 
also be interpreted as an attempt to soften the 
tension between Germany and Russia. However, 
the moment at which the transaction was effect-
ed is seen in Germany as being controversial. 
German firms have already sustained losses as 
a consequence of the conflict. These losses are 
above all an effect of the significant weakening 
of the Russian currency, causing a serious fall 
in the value of income transferred from Russia 
to Germany. The media have also reported that 
many firms had withheld their decision to invest 
in Russia. Companies fear that sanctions could 
adversely affect their financial results and that 
this will be difficult to compensate given that the 
financial crisis is still ongoing in the EU. A dete-
rioration of relations with Russia could also se-
riously undermine their negotiating position as 
part of the competition for contracts connected 
with the organisation of the 2018 FIFA World 
Cup on Russia. Berlin does not want to restrict 
economic relations with Moscow precisely due 
to this resistance from a section of German busi-
ness engaged in Russia; one exception was the 
decision to suspend the implementation of the 
contract by the weapons producer Rheinmetall 
AG covering the construction of a combat train-
ing centre in Mulino in Russia. The contract is 
worth 120 million euros. However, this decision 
has also been determined as “temporary”. 
10 Joe Kaeser, the CEO of Siemens, met President Putin on 
26 March. They discussed the future investment con-
ditions for this German company among other issues; 
http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/2014-03/
ukraine-krim-putin-siemens
11 On 17 March, RWE signed an agreement under which 
RWE DEA was sold to LetterOne for 5.1 billion euros. 
RWE DEA is involved in oil and gas exploration and pro-
duction in the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany and 
Poland. The sale was probably motivated above all by 
RWE’s deteriorating financial results due to problems on 
the energy market in Germany. 
Germany will take active measures to 
de-escalate the conflict, since in the case 
of its aggravation Germany will be forced 
under external pressure to take further 
steps against Russia.
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It is also worth emphasising that part of the 
economic elite are aware of the fact that Mos-
cow’s violation of international law set a dan-
gerous precedent which has adversely affected 
the investment climate in Central Europe, where 
Germany invests much more heavily than in 
Russia. The Russian economy’s co-dependence 
on exports of its raw materials to Europe is also 
well-known and has been emphasised in inter-
views given by the presidents of the Federation 
of German Industries and the German Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce12. 
Forecasts
Unless the Russian-Ukrainian conflict worsens, the 
German government will continue its policy of re-
ducing tension. In the German interpretation this 
means de facto, if not de jure, recognition of the 
annexation of Crimea and putting pressure both 
on President Putin to normalise relations with 
Ukraine as soon as possible and on the Ukrainian 
government to accept Russian demands. 
If the conflict escalates, external pressure will 
force Germany to take further steps against 
Russia, which would put both the economic in-
terests of Germany and the future of building 
European security in co-operation with Russia 
at stake. Berlin can feel the effects of pres-




ment-fuer-den-Arbeitsmarkt.html Russia benefits from 
foreign trade alone as a consequence of a trade surplus 
at 4-6 billion euros annually. This is equivalent to adding 
this amount directly to Russian foreign currency reserves. 
sure from the USA and part of the EU’s mem-
ber states to take more radical measures that 
would go beyond just strong rhetoric already at 
this stage of the conflict13.
In the long term, Russia’s stance in the conflict 
with Ukraine will reinforce the viewpoint shared 
by some in the German government that the 
Kremlin’s ruling elite has a destructive power 
and is irrational, resulting in: (a) an accelerated 
process of diversification of investments and 
raw material imports coming into Germany, 
(b) an intensification of the internal dispute in 
Germany on its Russian policy, as a consequence 
of which the lack of a concept for this policy will 
become especially evident; and (c) even more 
caution in dealing with Russia, especially as re-
gards the EU eastern neighbourhood policy. Al-
though Ukraine’s accession to the EU is not on 
the agenda in German policy, fear of Russian ac-
tions could bring about a change in Germany’s 
approach to signing the economic part of the 
negotiated Accession Agreement with Ukraine 
and also with Moldova. 
13 Nikolas Busse, ‘Der verborgene Teil deutscher Auss-
enpolitik’, FAZ, 27 March 2014 http://www.faz.net/




granicznej__.html#BoxWiadTxt “Despite initial reserva-
tions, Germany will offer military assistance to eastern 
NATO member states,” Der Spiegel reported on Saturday. 
The Ministry of Defence wants to support the Baltic states 
with a maximum of six fighter aircraft. A warship will also 
be sent to the Baltic Sea. “Germany will take part in rein-
forced routine operations in NATO” by a source from the 
inner circle of the minister of foreign affairs, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, disclosed to the weekly. Quoted from: http://
zw.lt/litwa/niemcy-przysla-mysliwce-krajow-baltyckich/
